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INTRODUCTION
Businesses, healthcare providers, and others gather, store, and
use our data every day. In the process, these entities may end up
committing privacy harms. For example, Equifax might fail to utilize
proper measures to safeguard your credit information, leaving it
vulnerable to hacking. Or a Health Maintenance Organization
employee might negligently leave a laptop with your health
information on an airplane. Perhaps a retail store decides to sell
information about your purchases to a third party without your
permission. What should be the consequence of these privacy harms?
And what is the best legal mechanism for addressing them?
The privacy regulation question is the subject of vigorous current
debate. The widespread gathering of data about consumers and its
use in business activities, including behavioral advertising, concerns
privacy advocates. Such use of consumer data appears invasive, and
even potentially deceptive, leading to calls for more vigorous
regulation through the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
states, common law actions, and new legislation. 1 Adding to the
consternation of privacy advocates is a rash of reports of security
breaches at a variety of retail firms, leading to hackers and other
unintended third parties gaining access to consumer information.2 As
a result, an explosion of consumer data privacy legislation has been
introduced in Congress recently, 3 and many more legislative
1. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Report Rings Alarm Bells About Privacy on the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at C10 (noting privacy advocates’ arguments that self-regulation
is insufficient). A number of privacy organizations have been actively involved in
advocacy. See Angelique Carson, Changing Tactics: The Rise of the Privacy Advocates,
THE INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Sept. 23, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/changingtactics-the-rise-of-the-privacy-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/KP5Z-QYUN] (mentioning,
through reference to a single example, the advocacy work of EPIC, the Center for Digital
Democracy, Consumer Watchdog, Patient Privacy Rights, US PIRG, and the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse).
2. See Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Record High in 2014,
IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies
/2014databreaches.html [https://perma.cc/33V3-7DRA].
3. See, e.g., Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 2977, 114th Cong.
(2015); Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Breach Notification and
Punishing Cyber Criminals Act of 2015, S. 1027, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security Act of
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proposals have been introduced at the state level.4 More than half of
states now have data disposal laws to ensure that information content
is protected, and at least thirteen states have data security laws that
regulate how data is stored, maintained, and used.5 These proposed
and enacted laws provide strong evidence that consumer data issues
currently rank highly on the agenda of many lawmakers.
On the other side of the debate, pro-business advocates caution
that stringent privacy protections can unduly hamstring the
development of highly valuable technological innovations to the
ultimate detriment of consumers.6 Bolstering their arguments, some
scholars question the extent to which privacy regulations are
2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, H.R.
1770, 114th Cong. (2015); Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2015, H.R.
1704, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 117, 114th
Cong. (2015); Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995,
113th Cong. (2014); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, H.R. 3990, 113th
Cong. (2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014, S. 1976, 113th Cong.
(2014); Data Security Act of 2014, S. 1927, 113th Cong. (2014); Personal Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014).
4. See State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/5592D9ZV] (tracking new and proposed state privacy law).
5. Data Security Laws—Private Sector, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/78VX-75Z9]. In addition,
half of the states prevent employers and/or universities from conditioning work or
educational opportunities on having access to student or employee personal internet
accounts. State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (May 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-acess-to-social-media-usernanes-andpasswords.aspx [https://perma.cc/49U8-F39M]. Several states have begun to prohibit the
private use of GPS tracking systems without the target’s consent. Pam Greenberg, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Private Use of Mobile Tracking Devices, 24
LEGISBRIEF, no. 43 (Nov. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legisbriefs/2016/lb
_2443.pdf [https://perma.cc/jrl6-g7nr].
6. See, e.g., Ed Burns, Data Collection Practices Spark Debate on Big Data Ethics,
Privacy, SEARCHBUSINESSANALYTICS (Apr. 2014), http://searchbusinessanalytics
.techtarget.com/feature/Data-collection-practices-spark-debate-on-big-data-ethics-privacy
[https://perma.cc/V5YT-BCS9] (quoting Mike Zaneis, then-Executive Vice President of
the Interactive Advertising Bureau, saying “[h]aving Congress or the FTC write
prescriptive rules around an industry that is changing every day is the surest way to inhibit
growth”); see also Jane Yankowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1 (2011) (arguing that restrictions on the use of anonymized data inhibits advances
in research). See generally James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, The Missing Role of
Economics in FTC Privacy Policy, reprinted in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER
PRIVACY (Jules Polonetsky, Evan Selinger & Omer Tene, eds.) (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 20) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that
“consumers would benefit immensely if economics were to play as central a role in privacy
regulation as it does in antitrust”).
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appropriate, given that privacy harms tend to be both subjective and
heterogeneous. 7 Subjective harms are not reliably measurable by
third parties, which makes it difficult for courts to assess liabilities for
breaches and for policy makers to determine appropriate tradeoffs
between costs and benefits of particular data use and storage
practices.8 Privacy harms are heterogeneous harms in the sense that
rules regarding data use benefit those who value their privacy more
highly but not those who attach less value to such protections. In a
world where privacy regulations necessarily interfere with
technological product and marketing developments, the latter group
is not just indifferent to regulation. Rather, they are affirmatively
harmed. The presence of substantial costs to consumers in the case of
either too much or too little regulation suggests that a careful costbenefit policy analysis is essential for consumer privacy.
Because industry advocates have so far successfully fought off
most new federal legislative proposals, privacy advocates have turned
to other regulatory vehicles, including state legislation,9 private class
actions, 10 Federal Communications Commission regulation, 11 and
7. J. Howard Beales III describes the subjective nature of privacy as follows:
Privacy is one area where such subjective preferences are important. As the FTC’s
preliminary report noted in 2010, “for some consumers, the actual range of
privacy-related harms is much wider and includes . . . the fear of being monitored
or simply having private information ‘out there.’” Consumers may also feel
harmed when information is used “in a manner that is contrary to their
expectations,” and may have “discomfort with the tracking of the online searches
and browsing.” Some have summarized these kinds of harms as “creepiness.”
The FTC at 100: Views from the Academic Experts: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, H.R. 113th Cong. 6
(2014) (statement of J. Howard Beales III, Professor of Strategic Mgmt. and Pub. Policy,
George Washington Univ. Sch. of Bus.) [hereinafter statement of J. Howard Beales III]
(first quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 20
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionbureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2ZQ-RYNU], then quoting Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a
World Where Information Control is Failing, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 417–21 (2013)).
8. See id. at 25 (arguing that consumer privacy must be accurately valued because
firm behaviors that can interfere with privacy also create value in subsidizing technological
improvements, facilitating better consumer decisions, and enabling better monitoring for
credit card fraud).
9. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 4.
10. See infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
11. In 2016, the FCC adopted a regulation that would require internet service
providers to obtain the affirmative permission of consumers before selling consumer data.
47 C.F.R. § 64 (2017). In spring 2017, the regulation was repealed. Act of Apr. 3, 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88; see also Brian Fung, Trump Has Signed Repeal of the FCC
Privacy Rules. Here’s What Happens Next., WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Apr. 4, 2017),
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Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement complaints 12 to
police consumer data uses. Class action complaints rely on state and
federal statutes as well as common law causes of action to recover
damages for consumer harms that result from a firm’s privacy
practices.13 As is well known, class actions have the advantage of
enabling a large number of consumers who have also suffered small
damages to aggregate those claims into larger cases that make
pursuing legal remedies much more feasible.14 The downside to class
actions is that plaintiffs’ attorneys can use them to extract monetary
settlements even in cases that lack merit, due to the substantial
potential liabilities that a class action poses.15 Moreover, class action
settlements can involve substantial legal fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys
with relatively modest relief for consumers;16 thus, they can achieve
deterrence, sometimes overdeterrence, without actually effectively
compensating harms.
In conjunction with class actions, the FTC has emerged as the
primary federal regulator of the commercial use of consumer data
over the past twenty years.17 During the 1990s, industry took on
efforts to self-regulate company gathering, use, and security of
consumer data. As part of that self-regulatory effort, firms were
pressured into providing notice to consumers regarding what the
company would do with consumers’ data. In fact, between 1998 and
2001, firms underwent a dramatic shift in their use of privacy notices,
with virtually no websites listing privacy policies in 1998 to all of the
most popular websites displaying privacy notices by 2001.18 Along the
way, the FTC undertook the role of augmenting companies’ selfhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/04/04/trump-has-signed-repeal-ofthe-fcc-privacy-rules-heres-what-happens-next/?utm_term=.70257b90adcd [https://perma.cc
/C4XQ-EE27].
12. For a survey of FTC enforcement actions involving privacy, see Daniel J. Solove
& Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 583, 600–08 (2014).
13. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
14. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:3, at 7, 9 (5th ed.
2011).
15. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the “intense pressure to settle” that people who are involved in class actions
face).
16. See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137,
138–39, 148–49 (2001) (discussing examples derived from RAND Corporation study of
class action settlements).
17. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 590–606.
18. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over
Personal Information?, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 587, 593 (2007).
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regulation by enforcing representations and promises that firms make
to consumers in their privacy policies.19 In particular, section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) gives the FTC authority
to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 20 and the FTC
deemed it deceptive for a company to fail to abide by its own privacy
policy representations.21 Over time, the FTC has gradually moved
toward using its section 5 authority beyond merely enforcing the
details of the privacy policies in an effort to ensure that firms’ privacy
efforts comport with industry norms and consumer expectations.22
The FTC has extremely limited ability to unilaterally impose
monetary liability on firms,23 but through its authority to “prohibit”
unfair or deceptive practices, it can engage in “command-andcontrol” regulation. 24 Firms fearful of the consequences of FTC
enforcement typically respond to enforcement actions against them
by entering into settlement agreements with the agency under which
the firm agrees to comply with a set of expectations that the FTC
might or might not have formal authority to impose.25 Included in
many settlements is an agreement that the firm will refrain from
certain business practices for a number of years, during which time
the firm agrees to FTC or other external monitoring of its activities.26
FTC enforcement actions are thus similar to class actions in that they
can induce settlement agreements that are not clearly rooted in
governing legal principles, and the two mechanisms together
contribute to a significant lack of clarity regarding the obligations of
similarly situated firms.27

19. Id. at 599.
20. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311 § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)).
21. Haynes, supra note 18, at 599.
22. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 661.
23. Id. at 661 & n.59.
24. “Command-and-control” regulation occurs when a government entity mandates
or forbids action rather than providing economic incentives to move regulated entities into
more desirable activities. For a discussion of the tradeoff, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A.
Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 95, 99 (2015).
25. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 610–19 (discussing the prevalence of FTC
settlements and common attributes of FTC settlement orders).
26. See id.; see also Cooper & Wright, supra note 6 (discussing commonality of
lengthy monitoring or cease and desist periods).
27. On the lack of clarity regarding FTC guiding policy, see Michael D. Scott, The
FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the Commission
Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 183 (2008); Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell
Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security
Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 676 (2013).
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Moreover, each of these methods of addressing consumer data
use and protection is imperfect, in that they can lead to too much or
too little effective regulation. In particular, the subjective and
heterogeneous nature of harm to consumers makes it highly unlikely
that the FTC, lawyer advocates, or courts will accurately assess the
value of consumer privacy. What is needed is a mechanism designed
to elicit information about the value that consumers place on privacy,
which would solve the subjectivity problem, as well as specific
information about individual consumer valuation, which would solve
the heterogeneity problem.
Markets utilize pricing mechanisms and thus can treat the
problem of valuing consumer privacy relatively effectively in many
contexts. Indeed, U.S. companies are beginning to use such price
mechanisms in the privacy-relevant marketing of their goods and
services. Grocery and drug store chains have instituted loyalty
programs, under which consumers who are comfortable sharing their
purchasing information for purposes of targeted advertising and
otherwise pay lower prices for many items than customers who do not
participate in the data-sharing programs.28 In addition, in 2015 AT&T
began to offer its GigaPower U-Verse fiber-optic internet access
service in Kansas City for two different prices: a higher price for
customers who do not want their online browsing tracked for
purposes of company-generated targeted advertising and a lower
price for customers whose browsing will be tracked.29 In addition,
many companies that are sensitive to consumer concerns about
privacy offer products that leave many sharing decisions to the
consumers.30
However, what happens when privacy decisions are not or should
not be left to the marketplace? In some cases, price discrimination or
filtering is not feasible for the company. In others, technological or
other market changes place pressure on the company to scale back on
28. Martin H. Bosworth, Loyalty Cards: Reward or Threat?, CONSUMER AFF. (July
11,
2005),
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/loyalty_cards.html
[https://perma.cc/5LAY-LWGC].
29. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Thomas Gryta, AT&T Offers Data Privacy—for a Price,
WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/18/attoffers-data-privacy-for-a-price/ [https://perma.cc/UUT8-7BNV (dark archive)]. AT&T
stopped this price discrimination in 2016. Sean Buckley, AT&T Stops Tracking Internet
Activity of GigaPower Customers, FIERCETELECOM (Sept. 30, 2016, 10:22 AM),
http://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/at-t-to-sunset-internet-activity-tracking-requirement
-for-gigapower-customers [https://perma.cc/A558-MPZU].
30. For example, laptops, smart watches, mobile websites, and other products now
commonly contain privacy setting menus. See Brian X. Chen, How to Protect Your Private
Data From Prying Apps, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2017, at B6.
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prior promises regarding privacy protections, causing potential
difficulties for long-term contracts. Separately, sometimes other
policy considerations, such as fairness or distrust for consumer
choices, should trump these private market decisions.31 Although no
ex post regulatory mechanism can perfectly treat the problems of
subjectivity and heterogeneity, this Article conducts a thought
experiment into whether a different regulatory policy tool could be
more effective than those currently used to treat privacy violations. In
particular, this Article explores the possibility of an alternative,
informal dispute resolution mechanism that carries the promise of
eliciting at least rough information about how consumers value their
privacy. Specifically, might the use of an arbitral mechanism, one
jointly consented to by a company and FTC, be preferable to both
FTC action and private class actions?
Arbitration can at least roughly filter out consumers who place a
low value on their privacy because individuals who feel harmed by
company actions must file claims to get relief, which will likely entail
a cost that low-value consumers would not incur. As long as the
financial costs to consumers are kept low or negligible, then
consumers who do experience harm should not be discouraged from
coming forward, and, assuming that compensation levels reasonably
compensate high-privacy-value plaintiffs for their harms, the resulting
liabilities can more closely resemble the social value of privacy to a
firm’s customers. These liabilities can be superior to FTC direct
enforcement, which lacks reliable valuation mechanisms. In theory,
these liabilities can also be superior to class actions, which could
incorporate valuation mechanisms into the claims process, but not in
an incentive-compatible manner, at least according to the federal
courts that have considered the matter.32 With FTC oversight, the
incentive difficulties could be more reliably managed. And with
voluntary participation by firms, companies could be protected from
being strong-armed into a liability scheme that leaves them worse off.
Although an arbitration mechanism might cause firms to
internalize privacy harms more effectively because only a portion of
customers would step forward to file and prosecute claims, the
resulting claim filing might not accurately sort high- and low-privacyvalue customers. A customer angry with the improper use, sharing, or
exposure of her data might be more inclined to file a claim for relief
31. See FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1159–60 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(denying Amazon’s summary judgment request regarding billing consumers for
unauthorized in-app charges incurred by children).
32. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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while those less concerned about privacy may be less inclined to file a
claim. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that some customers
who place a high value on their privacy will not bring claims because
the opportunity costs of filing the claim are too high or the remedy
available too small, while some low-value customers will step forward
with claims because their opportunity costs are low and the remedy
sufficiently large. Unless one feels comfortable concluding that the
high-income, fully employed people in society tend to place a low
value on privacy while the lower income and underemployed people
place a high value on privacy, the “pricing” mechanism generated
with arbitration will create a mismatch. If the point of the pricing is
merely to force a company to correctly internalize the costs of privacy
violations, this mismatch would not matter if the number of inert
high-value claimants is about equivalent to the number of active lowvalue claimants. Without a reliable pricing mechanism, however,
there is no way of knowing consumers’ valuations. Indeed, odds are
that the mix is not accurate. One could counter that the partial
compensation is at least better than either no company liability or full
liability for all customers, but without a confident sense of how far off
the mark the arbitration scheme is, it does not necessarily represent a
policy improvement.
Fortunately, there is a technique that could improve the sorting
mechanism for claims in arbitration. In particular, if a private market
in plaintiffs’ claims insurance were permitted, even encouraged by the
FTC, then customers who place a high value on privacy could ensure
a right to be compensated for violations through the purchase of ex
ante (pre-violation) insurance. Specifically, the insurer, for a premium
fee, could agree to represent plaintiffs in the event that they suffer a
compensable privacy violation. As part of its offered services, the
insurer might also act as a privacy violation monitor. Only those
customers who place a high value on privacy would likely purchase
such insurance because the premiums would represent a certain
financial outlay in return for only a probabilistic future payout. When
the insurer also acts as market watchdog, the premium paid by the
consumer could also be viewed as a type of donation to a privacy
advocate seeking to hold companies accountable. In either case,
customers who place a low value on privacy would not be expected to
participate. Third-party insurers should be permitted to bring
aggregated claims representing those customers who paid premiums
prior to the discovery of a privacy violation. Otherwise, aggregated
claims should not be permitted in arbitration. If the costs of the
privacy violation are small, individual arbitral claims might not be
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feasible. And, if the harm to a privacy violation is large, then
individual claims would be encouraged, further adding to ex ante
deterrence.
Part I briefly describes the current FTC enforcement and class
action mechanisms. It explains why each mechanism can individually
lead to either too much or too little consumer data protections and
points out that the concurrent use of the two mechanisms enhances
the likelihood of too much data protections. Part II introduces the
alternative arbitration enforcement mechanism and demonstrates
why, if carefully constructed, it could produce more efficient
incentives for companies. Part II also explores a number of
complications and potential objections and concludes that none is
strong enough to preclude experimentation of the arbitral
enforcement mechanism, subject to the potential development of a
third-party claims insurance mechanism.
I. FTC ORDERS, CLASS ACTIONS, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
A. FTC Enforcement Actions
Under section 5 of the FTC Act, the agency is empowered to
bring enforcement actions against firms that engage in deceptive or
unfair business practices.33 According to the FTC, a firm’s action is
deemed deceptive if it engages in “a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” 34 In the context of
consumer data privacy, a firm’s actions are deemed deceptive if the
company fails to comply with its own privacy policies, if it fails to take
the data security efforts that it represents it takes, or if it fails to
clearly disclose material information about the manner in which it will
gather, use, and/or store consumer data.35 In addition, a firm’s actions
can be deemed deceptive if its privacy notice is buried in documents
where consumers are unlikely to find the notice,36 if it fails to fully
disclose the gathering and use of consumer information,37 or if it fails

33. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311 § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)).
34. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Comm.
Chairman on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, at 176 (Oct. 14,
1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–84 (1984).
35. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 628–30 (describing “broken promise” cases).
36. See id. at 658, 671–72.
37. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 3–4, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No.
0823099, Dkt. No. C-4264, (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 2979770, at *3–4.
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to disclose the consequences of consumer behaviors.38 Finally, a firm’s
privacy notices can be deemed deceptive if they contain overly vague
statements or promises that fail to properly inform customers of the
risks to their privacy.39
A firm’s actions can be deemed unfair if they fail to comport with
sound business practices in a manner that harms consumers.40 FTC
authority here is limited to prohibiting any trade practice that “causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 41
Moreover, the FTC has stated that it will not use this authority to
focus on trivial, speculative, emotional, or other subjective harms.42
Trade practices can be deemed unfair if they fail to disclose or
provide information that better enables consumers to make
meaningful choices among products or services. And, once a firm has
put in place a data privacy policy, it is deemed unfair for that firm to
unilaterally impose a retroactive change to that policy that erodes
consumers’ ability to rely on maintaining their privacy.43 Moreover,
firms are prohibited from using unfair product designs or software
settings, by, for example, making installed software nonremovable
from the customer’s computer. 44 Finally, firms that fail to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure personal information
can be deemed to have committed an unfair trade practice regardless
of the promises they make to their customers.45

38. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 25,
FTC v. Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2011).
39. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3–4,
FTC v. Echometrix, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-05516-DRH-ARL (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010).
40. See Letter from F.T.C. Chairman & Comm’rs to Hon. John C. Danforth, Member,
Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman,
Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., at 1073–74 (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in
Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 (1984).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
42. Letter from FTC Comm’rs to Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, supra note
40, at 1073 (“Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm . . . will not
ordinarily make a practice unfair. Thus, for example, the Commission will not seek to ban
an advertisement merely because it offends the tastes or social beliefs of some
viewers. . . .”).
43. See Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 467–73–50, 2004 WL 5662254, at *5–
8 (2004) (determining that it is unfair for a firm to retroactively change its privacy
practices as applied to previously collected consumer data).
44. Decision and Order at 2–4, Sony BMG Music Entm’t, File No. 0623019, Dkt. No.
C-4195 (F.T.C. June 28, 2007), 2007 WL 1942983, at *5–6.
45. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 8, United
States v. Rental Res. Servs., Inc., No. 0:09-cv-00524-PJS-JJK (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009);
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If, after a non-public investigation, the FTC concludes that a
practice is deceptive or unfair, the FTC is authorized to obtain ceaseand-desist orders, to require that companies take affirmative remedial
actions, and to monitor future activities.46 Specifically, the FTC issues
a proposed complaint containing a description of the alleged violation
and an order including the proposed remedy.47 At that point the
company has an opportunity to offer to settle the charges with the
proposed order made available for public comment.48 At the end of
the comment period, the FTC can issue a final order.49 Firms have
substantial incentives to settle rather than challenge the complaint
and order, because settlement avoids an expensive and public legal
battle and does not require that the firm admit wrongdoing. Of the
approximately 200 privacy-related complaints issued against
companies to date, apparently only three failed to reach resolution in
the form of a settlement.50 In fact, since virtually all firms enter into
settlements with the FTC, there are essentially no judicial precedents
regarding the FTC’s authority and development of de facto privacy
policies.51
Although FTC authority is indeed significant, the FTC is not
generally authorized to issue fines or monetary sanctions to firms
engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices.52 In a sense, then, its
authority consists of creating consumer property rules, or rules that
create the right to injunction, rather than liability rules, which only
require that a party pay for the damage caused by its actions.53 In
creating property rules, FTC orders tend to direct companies to
undertake a line of behavior that affects all of its consumers,
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other
Equitable Relief at 6, Rental Res. Servs. Inc., No. 0:09-cv-00524-PJS-JJK.
46. On the process, see generally A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/556H-4YC2].
47. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012); 2 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE
FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: ITS STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
PROCEDURES 39–40 (1981).
48. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 47, at 39–40.
49. Id.
50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 610–11.
51. Id. at 606.
52. The federal courts accept the FTC’s assertion of authority to seek equitable
monetary relief for restitution or rescission under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, but typically privacy violations do not include monetary liability. Id. at
611–12, 612 n.124; 15 U.S.C. § 53 (2012).
53. This important distinction originated in 1972. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972).
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regardless of how individual consumers value data privacy. In
creating these property rules, the FTC can also forbid the company
from bargaining around the property right through a consumer
contract. Instead, the regulation is more “command and control” in
nature.
One potential problem with FTC orders is that the subsequent
company conduct will tend to apply to all of its customers, despite
significant empirical evidence that many people place a relatively low
value on privacy.54 When deciding to bring an enforcement action, the
FTC might assume that all consumers will benefit from its
enforcement actions, thereby drastically overestimating the
proportion of consumers who would be benefitted.55 This risk comes
from the fact that consumers who are unhappy will file complaints,
either on their own behalf or through consumer advocacy groups,
whereas consumers who place a lower value on privacy will remain
inert. If FTC regulatory actions overvalue privacy, those actions
increase the cost of firms’ business operations, which would have the
effect of inefficiently raising prices for all of the company’s products,
services, and innovations, potentially eliminating some from the
marketplace.56
Just as the FTC can take actions that overprotect privacy, it can
also end up refraining from acting in ways that undervalue privacy.
Because consumer harms are both subjective (hard to value
monetarily by others) and heterogeneous (the value of privacy varies
across consumers), the FTC might choose not to pursue enforcement
actions out of a lack of demonstrated harm. Recall that significant
nonsubjective harm to consumers is typically a prerequisite to FTC
action on grounds of unfairness, and where harms are nonmonetary
and diversely experienced, the agency could inefficiently choose not
to seek to enjoin firm activities under either prong of its authority.
54. For a review of the empirical literature see Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, &
Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, J. ECON. LITERATURE 442, 462–78 (2016).
55. Recall from the introduction that consumers with low privacy values are
affirmatively harmed when FTC regulation forbids the use of technologies that aid those
customers.
56. See, e.g., Apple, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 1123108, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applestatementwright_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M446-D4M9] (dissenting statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright)
(“[P]lacing Apple under a twenty-year order in a marketplace in which consumer
preferences and technology are rapidly changing is very likely to do more to harm
consumers than it is to protect them.”); Testimony of J. Howard Beales III, supra note 7,
at 17 (“Regulation or enforcement that is too stringent may reduce the risk of the
particular privacy harms to which it is addressed, but it increases the risk of precluding
innovations that would make everyone’s life better.”).
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Even assuming that the FTC could accurately gauge the aggregate
harm to consumers (i.e., it knows how to value both high- and lowprivacy-value consumers), it will not know the relevant fraction of
high- and low-value consumers, a necessary assessment to
determining whether enforcement action is ultimately warranted.
Even if the FTC could reasonably assess consumer value, the
cost-benefit calculus requires an assessment of the regulatory costs,
which turns in part on forgone products and services, including future
innovations, facts that the FTC cannot know. This extra information
load on the government stems from the blunt property rights tool
afforded it. If the FTC could instead simply require firms to pay for
the privacy harms caused by their business practices, then the firm
could itself determine whether it makes good business sense to
continue its practices despite the potential for harms caused to a
portion of consumers. With property rules, FTC decisions can
unnecessarily harm either innovation-minded or privacy-minded
consumers.
In theory, then, when (1) harms are subjective and
heterogeneous, and (2) FTC actions constitute the only form of
consumer protection (a counterfactual), then FTC enforcement can
lead to (a) overregulation—because the FTC incorrectly overassesses
the number of consumers who suffer significant harms when it acts; or
(b) underregulation—because subjective and heterogeneous harms
can cause the FTC to refrain from acting despite significant injury to
consumer privacy. The difficulty is further exacerbated by the fact
that even if the FTC accurately gauges aggregate harm, the propertyrule solution fails to enable an efficient regulatory mechanism under
which firms internalize the costs of their practices for future business
decisions.
B.

Class Actions

Sitting alongside many possible FTC enforcement actions are
private lawsuits alleging state common law and statutory causes of
action.57 Individual privacy harms are typically not large enough to
justify the costs of bringing individual lawsuits, but plaintiffs’ lawyers
can aggregate claims through class action lawsuits. 58 Although
plaintiffs can and sometimes do request court orders and injunctive
57. See, e.g., Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(alleging breach of contract, invasion of privacy, conversion, unjust enrichment,
negligence, and state statutory claims); Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging contract, tort, and state statutory claims).
58. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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relief, often the primary remedy pursued and granted is monetary
relief. 59 The class action can thus act as a liability regime, and
therefore it carries the promise of offering firms the flexibility of
determining for themselves whether business practices should
continue.
Despite this promise, the class action also fails to produce
efficient results. To the extent that settlement is the norm because
firms fear their outside exposure and wish to eliminate negative
publicity, plaintiffs’ attorneys will bring too many lawsuits, causing
overdeterrence. 60 The potential overdeterrence problem is
exacerbated if every plaintiff in the class is deemed entitled to the
damages amount that reflects harm to high-privacy-value customers.
Often, however, defendants seek preliminary termination
through certification fights, summary judgment motions, or other
means, prior to agreeing to settle class claims. For example, a
defendant could seek a determination that plaintiffs’ privacy harms
are not recoverable because, as subjective harms, they are too
speculative. Such an argument might be deemed premature prior to
trial61 or inapt if state statutes specify statutory damages. Several
courts, however, have dismissed contract claims on grounds that the
privacy harms are too speculative.62 To the extent that courts are able
and willing to eliminate the possibility of plaintiff recovery, class
actions could provide too little deterrence.
Part II offers arbitration as a mechanism for sorting high- and
low-value consumers in a liability regime. Class actions also could
serve this function. Specifically, if a defendant is liable only to the
extent that individual plaintiffs collect their promised awards (a
“claims-made” approach), then the need to come forward, fill out

59. See How Do Consumer Class Action Lawsuits Work?, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N
(June 24, 2016), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCanUse/Pages
/LawYouCanUse-358.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZV45-E33L].
60. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995)
(arguing that class actions lead to “blackmail settlements” because defendants “fear . . .
the risk of bankruptcy [and] settle even if they have no legal liability,” rather than “stake
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial”).
61. See Claridge, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 861.
62. See, e.g., Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1028–29 (holding that disclosure of personally
identifying browsing histories did not cause damages cognizable under contract law);
Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that
alleged disclosure of a customer email address and consequent receipt of unwanted spam
emails did not create recoverable harms). But see In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 572 F.
App’x. 494, 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (mem.) (reversing the district court’s determination that
the sharing of personally identifiable information with advertisers did not create
recoverable harm).
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paperwork, show receipts, etc., can be a mechanism for sorting highand low-value claims even where a single damages amount is assessed
across all plaintiffs. Federal judges are hostile to claims-made
arrangements, however, because the schemes create problematic
incentives.63 Once the defendant bargains for claims-made liability,
the plaintiffs’ attorneys bargain for an assessment of attorneys’ fees
based on the total amount available for recovery rather than the
actual amounts recovered because of the delay in determining how
much is actually recovered. 64 Under those circumstances neither
defendants’ nor plaintiffs’ attorneys have any incentive to encourage
plaintiffs to come forward to receive their awards. In addition,
plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes worry that claims-made liabilities will
result in the defendant paying too little in damages,65 and, in any
event, it ensures that the defendant has no incentive to help
communicate with plaintiffs to increase the likelihood of
compensation. To resolve these problems, the lawyers will typically
negotiate for a fixed liability pot, with any unclaimed amounts going
to a charity or organization formed to combat the type of problem at
issue in the lawsuit.66 Under these circumstances, high- and low-value
consumers can be sorted, but the sorting does not affect the firm’s
ultimate liability, meaning that the prospect of overdeterrence
continues.

63. See, e.g., Stewart v. USA Tank Sales & Erection Co., No. 12-05136-CV-SW-DGK,
2014 WL 836212, at *6–9 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2014) (encouraging “the parties to confer on
an alternate settlement proposal that addresses the Court’s concerns”); Childs v. United
Life Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-23-PJC, 2012 WL 1857163, at *4–5 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2012)
(“[U]nder the circumstances presented here and the flaws in the original notice, the Court
finds that additional notice must be given.”); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10-CV01455-LHK, 2012 WL 1156399, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (“This certainly suggests
that . . . extinguishing the . . . class’s claims for no consideration would be unfair and
unreasonable.”).
64. Relatedly, some assert that plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes collude with
defendants so that defendants incur low liabilities (with reversionary settlements),
plaintiffs’ attorneys reap large fees (through clear sailing agreements), and plaintiffs end
up with little or nothing. William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form
of Collusion in Class Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 825–28 (2003).
65. This is particularly likely when plaintiffs suffer small damages, which is common
for privacy harms. When plaintiffs suffer small damages, most will decide that it is not
worth the effort and expense of claiming the award. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian &
Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A
Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 618–19 (2010).
66. Id. at 634.
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The Concurrence of FTC Enforcement and Class Actions

Firms are subject to both FTC enforcement and class action
lawsuits. The possibility of a class action can alleviate the potential
underdeterrence that can result when the FTC chooses not to bring
an enforcement action, and, conversely, the FTC enforcement option
can alleviate the potential underdeterrence that could result from an
unsuccessful class action. Thus, the concurrence of these two
mechanisms should shrink the underdeterrence problems that either
mechanism alone faces. However, the concurrence of the two actions
carries the potential of magnifying the overdeterrence problem that
can exist under either mechanism. For example, settling with the FTC
could add fuel to the fire of a class action lawsuit, on the grounds that
harmed consumers should be compensated because the firm agreed to
stop its trade practice. Indeed, when the variety of state, federal, and
international enforcement tools are cumulated, overdeterrence
becomes increasingly likely.
II. FTC-MONITORED ARBITRATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
This Part explores whether arbitration, coupled with claims
insurance, could improve the regulation of consumer privacy. Recall
that FTC enforcement orders or class actions can lead to either
underdeterrence or overdeterrence, and the accumulation of
enforcement actions can increase potential overdeterrence.67 Section
II.A briefly describes private arbitration and its recent use to replace
consumer class actions, and it explores whether arbitration could help
calibrate firm incentives to protect privacy. Section II.B discusses the
importance of FTC oversight and briefly describes the FTC’s prior
mixed success with arbitration. Section II.C identifies claims
insurance as a mechanism for mitigating a problem inherent in the
arbitration scheme. Finally, Section II.D addresses a number of
potential objections and complications associated with this alternative
mechanism.
A. Arbitrating Privacy Harms
The problem of calibrating deterrence of privacy harms can be
mitigated with enforcement schemes designed to better incorporate
pricing mechanisms into firms’ liabilities. The federal government
could experiment with arbitration, where appropriate, as a
mechanism likely to more efficiently channel consumer data use.

67. See supra Part I.
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Arbitration typically entails private dispute resolution.68 When
parties agree to binding arbitration, they usually forfeit their rights to
bring their claims to court.69 Instead, they jointly agree to hire a third
party to resolve them,70 and they often choose the arbitration rules to
be applied to their dispute. 71 Federal law and Supreme Court
precedent both support this private form of dispute resolution.72
Private arbitration is a creature of contract, and it is therefore a
heterogeneous beast. Most parties anticipate that arbitration will
reduce the costs of litigation 73 with reduced discovery, 74 informal
hearing procedures,75 and the use of expert arbitrators rather than
generalist judges.76 Moreover, arbitration allows claimants their “day
in court” in the sense that parties’ cases are not thrown out on
pleading technicalities, and summary proceedings are unusual. 77

68. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 2013).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. For an empirical examination of choice of arbitration rules in the arbitration
provisions of CEO employment contracts, see Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin
& Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 163–
64 (2012) (finding that of 469 clauses studied, all but eighteen either articulated the
governing procedures or chose pre-existing set of procedural rules to govern in
arbitration) or Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 66–69.
72. See Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, 670–71 (1947) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984)
(concluding that policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses requires that the
Federal Arbitration Act be interpreted to apply in state courts).
73. See Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial
Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A ForcedRank Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 203–09 (2002) reprinted in, TOWARDS A SCIENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 43, 45, 49
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Mainmark eds., 2005) (surveying the perceptions
and expectations of attorneys and their clients in commercial international arbitration).
74. 3 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 34.1 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (“Limitations on discovery . . .
remain one of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration . . . . Avoidance of the
delay and expense associated with discovery is still one of the reasons parties choose to
arbitrate.” (citing William L.D. Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial Case:
Practical Guidelines for Arbitrators and Counsel, 41 ARB. J. 15, 19 (1986))).
75. Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories
of Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 173 (2011).
76. Id. at 174–75.
77. See Mitchell L. Marinello, Protecting the Natural Cost Advantages of Arbitration,
AM. BAR ASS’N (2008), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice
_areas/corporate_naturalcost.html [https://perma.cc/JA2S-UBC6] (“Careful arbitrators
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Finally, for small value claims, some arbitral associations have
promulgated expedited procedures that enable claimants to prosecute
their claims without incurring the time and expense of meeting in
person.78 Courts have obligations to enforce both private arbitration
agreements and awards under international convention as well as
federal and state law79 with limited exceptions.80
The arbitration explored here is slightly different from that
contemplated under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). A
contractual obligation between the consumer and the company to
arbitrate their disputes is generally enforceable under the FAA,81 but
under current law, that contractual arrangement would not eliminate
the FTC’s authority to bring its own enforcement action.82 Moreover,
the contractual obligation would require the consent of the consumer.
The arbitration explored here would replace both private actions and
FTC enforcement orders, and it posits a voluntary arrangement made
between the firm and the FTC rather than between the firm and the
consumer. Despite a lack of consumer consent, an agreement
between the firm and the FTC that binds consumers might better
protect consumer interests. The FTC is better able to insist on
consumer-friendly arbitral attributes than the typical consumer, who
does not even read let alone understand the implications of the
arbitration agreement,83 and who typically is presented the arbitration
are wary of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and often will discourage or even
forbid them.”).
78. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 35 (2017), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/commercial
_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z9D-469Y] (“Where no party’s claim exceeds $25,000 . . . the
dispute shall be resolved by submission of documents, unless any party requests an oral
hearing, or the arbitrator determines that an oral hearing is necessary.”). Conversely,
although typically not present in consumer disputes, some parties choose much more
formalized arbitration mechanisms with highly-trained arbitrators; these parties (as well as
others) tend to choose arbitration to obtain a neutral decision maker. Drahozal, supra
note 75, at 174–75.
79. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); Unif. Arbitration Act, §§ 6–7, 7 U.L.A. 25–32 (2009); see
also Arbitration Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [https://perma.cc/WRY9-8SU3] (showing states which
have adopted the 2000 Uniform Arbitration Act).
80. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 10, 11.
81. Southland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7, 10–11 (1984).
82. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27–29 (1991) (noting
that the EEOC could still prosecute employee’s claim notwithstanding clause requiring
that the employee bring claims in arbitration).
83. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983); Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture
in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 166 (2007)
(“[C]orporations usually draft these form [arbitration] provisions knowing that consumers
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agreement on take-it-or-leave-it terms.84 Moreover, the arbitration
explored here would be subject to FTC oversight and monitoring,
which should provide further consumer protections. Admittedly,
however, the scheme proposed here does not leave the arbitration
choice to the consumer, and thus it potentially interferes with
consumer autonomy. Because the arbitral mechanism discussed here
would bind non-contractual parties as well as government
enforcement agencies, it does not fall within current statutory
schemes for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Thus,
Congressional legislation likely would be needed to implement this
scheme, a complication that is discussed further in the next Part.
Consumer arbitration is common in the United States, but it
remains controversial, 85 and it is not supported in some other
countries.86 Courts scrutinize arbitration clauses to make sure that
they are not unconscionable,87 but so long as the arbitration clauses
are found in valid contracts and do not contemplate unfair
procedures, they will be enforced. 88 One reason that consumer
arbitration is controversial in the U.S. is that firms can use it to
circumvent potential class action liability.89 As a result, in May 2016,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) proposed a
rule that would prohibit certain consumer financial product and
service providers from using a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that
generally do not read or understand these provisions.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2005) (“Empirical studies
have shown that only a minute percentage of consumers read form agreements, and of
these, only a smaller number understand what they read.” (citing Alan M. White & Cathy
Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002))).
84. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 53–56
(1997).
85. See STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 161–66 (2002)
(discussing this controversy); Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 128–30, 140–51 (2006)).
86. Sternlight, supra note 85, at 139–40.
87. DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 129–36. With FTC oversight of this arbitration,
court review might be unnecessary.
88. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 622 (2010) (“By 1991 . . . the Court had left open just
two avenues to contest arbitration clauses. First, a plaintiff could, theoretically, show that
the lack of judicial forum would thwart her ability to vindicate statutory rights—though
the Court had made clear that this would require forceful, specific proof. Second,
arbitration clauses remained susceptible to the same defenses that applied to any contract,
such as unconscionability.” (footnote omitted)).
89. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008) (“[E]very consumer
contract with an arbitration clause also included a waiver of classwide arbitration.”).
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worked to bar the consumer from filing or participating in a class
action against it.90
In general, however, U.S. courts must facilitate arbitrations, even
when they prevent class actions. In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,91 the Supreme Court struck down California’s refusal to
enforce AT&T’s arbitration clause on grounds that the clause was
unconscionable because plaintiffs were denied a class proceeding.92
Importantly for present purposes, AT&T’s arbitration clause was
designed to make arbitration both fair and feasible for any plaintiff
who wished to file an individual complaint against the company.93
Specifically, in addition to other favorable features, AT&T agreed to
pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; arbitration was to occur in the
claimant’s home county; all legal remedies were available in
arbitration; and, in the event that the consumer received an award
higher than what AT&T last offered in settlement, AT&T agreed to
pay a minimum recovery of $7500 and twice the claimant’s attorney’s
fees.94 The Concepcion decision is controversial and has generated
considerable criticism on grounds that arbitration can potentially be
used to erode consumers’ substantive rights.95
Whatever the relative merits of the Concepcion critiques,96 this
low-cost structure for resolving consumer disputes may be especially
well-suited for handling subjective and heterogeneous harms,
including privacy harms. As long as the financial costs of bringing an
arbitration action are minimized or eliminated and the procedures
adopted are fair to consumers, those plaintiffs who highly value their

90. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,830 (proposed May 24, 2016).
The implementation of this rule was abrogated by Congress following the 2016 elections.
Act of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (voiding the CFPB’s arbitration
rule).
91. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
92. Id. at 338, 340, 352.
93. Id. at 336–37.
94. Id. at 337.
95. See, e.g., Karen Weise, Consumer Protection Faces a ‘Tsunami’ in Court,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document
/M35HLE3HBS3K [https://perma.cc/4WNB-NYLE] (quoting legal commentators
describing the case as the most harmful in the history of consumer law, with the potential
to virtually end class actions against businesses); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012)
(“[I]f not legislatively limited, this case will substantially harm consumers, employees, and
perhaps others.”).
96. I have elsewhere defended Concepcion on the grounds that California’s effective
national control of the class waiver issue should be preempted in favor of federal
treatment. Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law
Coordination, 111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 700–01 (2013).
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privacy will have an incentive to bring claims. Those who place a low
value on their privacy will not bring claims, but segregation of highand low-value plaintiffs is desirable for more efficient pricing of
privacy harms.
Granted, this arbitration scheme only allows for a binary sorting
between plaintiffs, whereas consumers may value data privacy along a
continuum. If so, under the binary sorting, pure-efficiency pricing is
not possible. Nevertheless, the binary sort could prove surprisingly
effective in the context of privacy harms. Available empirical
evidence seems to indicate that when it comes to valuing privacy,
people seem to lie along a bimodal distribution.97 Some people value
privacy very highly, whereas others seem to care little about privacy.98
If consumer preferences are bimodal, then it is possible for a binary
sorting mechanism to sort the two groups effectively. Of course, the
effectiveness of this arbitral mechanism is highly sensitive to
structure, including especially the costs and benefits of proceeding to
arbitration and the remedies consumers can obtain there. But, if its
features are carefully calibrated, Concepcion-type arbitration can
“price discriminate” on the basis of subjective value, creating
economic incentives that are more efficient than the present legal
mechanisms used to protect privacy.
Consider the following example. Suppose that consumers
entered into a relationship with Company A, receiving its goods
and/or services, and thereafter A sold the consumers’ data to a third
party for use in behavioral marketing. Suppose further that at the
time that this relationship formed, A’s privacy policy stated that the
consumers’ information would not be shared with third parties.
Alternatively, A’s privacy policy could have stated that the
consumers’ information could be shared with third-party contractual
affiliates, but it did not make clear that the company might sell the
data to affiliates for use in behavioral marketing. In the first example,

97. See Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy
Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 100, 101 (2007) (examining the “discrepancy between individuals’ intentions to
protect their own privacy and how they behave in the marketplace”).
98. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, What is
Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 252 (2013) (finding that consumer research
subjects valued privacy more highly when anonymity was the default or initially-presented
option than when disclosure was the default or first option); Jacob T. Biehl, Eleanor G.
Rieffel & Adam J. Lee, When Privacy and Utility are in Harmony: Towards Better Design
of Presence Technologies, 17 PERS. & UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 503, 506–07 (2013)
(finding that privacy preferences in the context of automatic detection of individuals’
presence in the workplace tended to be distributed bimodally).
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the company might be subject to both private suit and to FTC
enforcement action for deception. In the second example, the
company might be subject to private suit and to FTC enforcement
action for both deceptive and unfair trade practices. Under this
proposal, an arbitration scheme could displace both private and
public actions in both examples. As an efficiency matter, the scheme
works best when the privacy harms are heterogeneous and hard to
forecast and where there are potential offsetting commercial benefits
to consumers from A’s actions.
In short, Concepcion-type arbitration can be superior to FTC
enforcement actions because it enables the sorting of consumer harms
and the pricing rather than outright prohibition of activities that
produce such harms, thus leaving greater product/service flexibility
for companies. And it can be superior to class actions because it does
not lump all consumers together for damage-assessment purposes. As
a result, subjective harms can be legally recognized and vindicated
without over-deterring corporate conduct. A problem exists with this
“sorting” mechanism, however, in that, at best, it only imperfectly
sorts consumers. No doubt some consumers who place a high value
on privacy but face high opportunity costs to their time will still not
bring claims, whereas some consumers who place a low value on
privacy but who face low opportunity costs would bring their claims.
It is possible that the two mismatched groups would serve to cancel
one another out, and calibration of the rules for recovery can help to
mitigate this problem. Nevertheless, the mismatch, and some
potential effects, will likely remain. Section II.C below explores one
possible market mechanism that carries the potential of alleviating
this weakness.
B.

The Importance of FTC Oversight and Voluntary Participation by
Firms

Because arbitral mechanisms can be unfair to consumers, the
FTC should oversee and monitor the proposed arbitration to ensure it
is consumer-friendly. Courts typically oversee the fundamental
fairness of arbitration with a variety of doctrines applied to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. 99 However,
because the scheme envisioned here would also displace
administrative orders, the FTC should play a much more active
oversight role. Consumer protections are particularly important
99. DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 106–52 (examining general contract law defenses to
arbitration agreements).
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under the proposal because FTC-approved arbitration would take
away consumer litigation rights even without the consumers’ consent
to arbitration. Whatever the effectiveness of consumer consent to
arbitration in other contexts, it might well be wholly absent here.
Specifically, in order to replace both class actions and FTC
enforcement orders, the FTC would have to approve the basic
structure, applicable procedural rules (which could be adapted from
any number of off-the-rack procedural rules promulgated by private
arbitral organizations), and cost allocations. FTC oversight could
provide the opportunity to introduce an arbitral mechanism that is
more fair to consumers than that seen in the context of purely private
arbitration. At a minimum, a record of the arbitrated dispute and the
basis of a consumer’s claim should be publicly available. The arbitral
mechanism might even include an affirmative obligation to notify the
company’s consumers, in order to ensure that high-value consumers
will have knowledge about their own claims. Consumers can be given
more liberal rights of discovery as well as other rights that protect
their ability to vindicate claims.
FTC-approved consumer arbitration already exists for many
automobile purchasers. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 100
provides a set of obligations that manufacturers must comply with
when entering into a warranty with the consumer. 101 The Act
encourages the use of informal dispute resolution mechanisms and
directs the FTC to prescribe rules setting forth minimum standards
for dispute resolution programs utilized by companies and described
in their warranties.102 Pursuant to this direction, the FTC promulgated
such minimum standards, which include an annual audit of the
program to ensure its compliance with the guidelines.103 Several of the
leading automobile manufacturers have instituted the Automobile
Warranty Arbitration Program, which handles consumer disputes
regarding automobile warranties.104 The program is administered by

100. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93–637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012)).
101. Id. §§ 102–108, 88 Stat. at 2185–89.
102. Id. § 110(a), 88 Stat. at 2189.
103. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 703.7 (2017).
104. The FTC makes available the most recent audit of this arbitration program, which
includes a general discussion of the program. See CLAVERHOUSE ASSOCS., 2015 AUDIT
OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY
ARBITRATION PROGRAM) 3–4 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports
/2015-audit-national-center-dispute-settlement-automobile-warranty-arbitration-program
/2015_ftc_national_audit.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFX4-39ZP].
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the National Center for Dispute Settlement,105 which undergoes the
annual FTC-mandated audit in order to remain approved.106
The arbitration program standards applicable under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are designed for companies to adopt
ex ante, so that the warranty agreement between the company and
the consumer actually contains an arbitration clause.107 Moreover, the
approved arbitral mechanism must be nonbinding, according to the
FTC’s rules.108 In contrast, the proposed mechanism for privacy claims
would be binding, meaning that the consumers lose their rights to
bring class actions. Also in contrast to automobile arbitration, a
privacy-claim arbitral mechanism could, at least in theory, be either
put in place ex ante (prior to any privacy violation) or ex post (as a
settlement technique for FTC enforcement actions, to be used in lieu
of FTC enforcement orders). Companies heavily enmeshed in the
gathering and storage of data (i.e., Google, Facebook, etc.) might
obtain generalized approval for specific types of future claims/actions,
much as the automobile manufacturers have done for warranty
disputes. Other companies might not be able to forecast a significant
likelihood of FTC enforcement actions. In order for the arbitral
scheme to work for them, the target companies would have to
negotiate with the FTC for an arbitral mechanism after
complaints/investigations materialize. Presumably these ex post
arbitral schemes could benefit from the guidance provided by ex ante
mechanisms. Alternatively, the FTC could set up its own arbitral

105. See id. at 4. Other major American automobile manufacturers utilize the Better
Business Bureau (“BBB”) Auto Line arbitration program. See Agency Information
Collection Activities, 82 Fed. Reg. 8614, 8615 (Jan. 26, 2017) (identifying the two
arbitration programs operating under the FTC’s Dispute Resolution Rule as the National
Center for Dispute Settlement and the BBB Auto Line program); see also Participating
Auto Manufacturers, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/autoline/bbb-auto-lineprocess/participating-auto-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/R99S-Q47P] (listing over two
dozen participating manufacturers).
106. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.7(a).
107. Cf. Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that the failure to disclose in the warranty a term or clause requiring the
utilization of an informal dispute resolution mechanism “contravenes the text, legislative
history, and purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act”).
108. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j). Binding arbitration is, however, not precluded by the
regulations as long as both parties agree to it. See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and
Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,167, 60,211 (Dec.
31, 1975) (clarifying that a warrantor and a consumer could agree to submit their dispute
to binding arbitration either after the Mechanism has rendered a decision or instead of
proceeding under the Mechanism, but that binding arbitration may not be mentioned in
the written warranty).

96 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2018)

736

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

mechanisms that companies could opt into as part of its settlement
with the FTC or as part of the company’s contract with consumers.
FTC oversight can prevent a number of potential problems that
might arise for company-instituted arbitration. When enforcing
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, courts often seek to
ensure that firms do not fashion unfair processes,109 and the FTC
should assume that role under this scheme. In addition, courts are
sometimes concerned about a potential repeat-player effect, which
can arise when the company participates in repeated arbitrations but
the consumers each participate only once.110 To obtain the firm’s
repeat business, arbitrators’ determinations might unduly favor the
firm.111 Potential repeat-player problems could be handled by having
the FTC refer complaining consumers to a panel of potential lawyers
who routinely handle claims in arbitration. In fact, if a given advocate
represents multiple consumers who file similar claims against a firm,
then the advocate could possibly aggregate those claims in order to
achieve cost efficiencies. Alternatively, the FTC could decertify those
arbitrators who show a bias in favor of company rulings. Making
public the arbitration claims and rulings can help defuse the potential
for repeat player bias. If the FTC sets up its own arbitration, it could
hire consumer-friendly arbitrators.
Furthermore, if a firm faces liability only to the extent that
consumers are willing to file claims, the firm might have little
incentive to alert consumers to the presence of the arbitration
scheme. In order to overcome this difficulty, the FTC might require
that the company widely distribute information about the arbitration
option to consumers, at least once an FTC investigation and
complaint indicates that remedial actions might be warranted. The
FTC could also notify consumers of active arbitrations on its websites.
109. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 68, at 690.
110. See Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(striking the arbitration clause and noting that employer’s choice of arbitral forum
resulted in only eight available arbitrators, which created a potential repeat player effect).
111. For discussions of a possible repeat player effect, see Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 209–
10 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223, 238–39 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 472–79 (1996); Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1,
14–15 (2011). The repeat-player problem can be mitigated by, for example, using a large
pool of arbitrators or enlisting arbitration-experienced advocates to represent consumer
interests.
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Consumer advocates also might have a financial incentive to notify
consumers of potential claims.
Finally, the FTC might impose rules designed to ensure that
consumers do not face overly-large costs to bringing claims. While
opportunity and financial costs can operate as a valuable mechanism
for sorting consumers who place high and low values on privacy,
sorting requires that the effective costs to arbitration be low enough
to attract high-privacy-value consumers. Thus, costs would need to be
carefully scrutinized. Indeed, one requirement of the automobile
warranty arbitration is that the consumer bear no financial costs to
arbitrate.112 Perhaps overall administrative costs can be reduced with
aggregated claims options through insurance and/or by enabling
single arbitrators to handle multiple similar claims individually.
Voluntary participation by firms is equally important. Assuming
that the FTC seeks to oversee arbitration in the best interest of
consumers,113 it would ensure that arbitrations are procedurally fair
to, and protect the substantive rights of, consumers. However,
excessive consumer rights could impose dispute resolution costs on
firms that are so large that the overdeterrence problem mentioned
earlier is not actually alleviated. If firms retain the right to opt into or
out of an FTC-approved program, then any resulting arbitration
mechanisms should be Pareto-superior114 to current legal enforcement
mechanisms. Mechanically, firms could seek approval for proposed
arbitration schemes, followed by FTC feedback and pushback,
followed by a firm’s decision whether to participate in an arbitral
scheme as shaped by the FTC. A credible threat not to participate in
the FTC-shaped arbitration could enable a firm to negotiate to a
mutually agreeable position with the FTC. Note that legal rules,
112. 16 C.F.R. § 703.3(a). However, this rule has been interpreted to allow for some
costs to be placed on consumers, including “initially notifying the Mechanism of the
dispute, . . . provid[ing] the information needed by the Mechanism to fairly resolve the
dispute[,] . . . . developing and submitting any rebuttal evidence,” and obtaining copies of
any “Mechanism records relating to the dispute.” See Rules, Regulations, Statements, and
Interpretations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,204 (1975)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 703). “Except for the cost of notifying the Mechanism and the cost
of complying with reasonable requests for necessary information,” all other costs able to
be placed on the consumer are voluntary costs and “the Mechanism will still render a
decision” even if the consumer decides not to bear the costs. Id.
113. Consumer protection is the FTC’s charge, although agency capture theorists might
challenge this assumption. For a discussion of agency capture in industries charged with
consumer protection, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 64–78 (2010).
114. Pareto-superior policies make some people better off without harming others. See
David S. Bullock, Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient
Redistribution Hypothesis, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1236, 1237 (1995).
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which force firms into court, would not achieve this important
corporate buy-in.
C.

Third-Party Insurer/Monitors

As mentioned in Section II.A above, the central problem with
using arbitration to effectively price privacy is that the sorting
mechanism will be imperfect. In particular, some decisions to file (or
not to file) claims in arbitration will be motivated by the consumer’s
opportunity costs as reflected in employment, wages, and other
matters rather than by the degree to which the consumer actually
values privacy. One way to treat this problem is to enable higher
earning consumers to obtain higher arbitration awards than those
awarded to lower earning consumers. Perhaps some privacy violations
would naturally lead to such damage patterns (i.e., identity theft or
loss of reputation/income), but categorically awarding damages based
on the income of the claimant seems problematic due to perceived
class discrimination.
An alternative mechanism that could alleviate the mismatch
between claims and privacy valuations would be claims insurance
made available to consumers prior to the privacy violation(s) in
question. With claims insurance, a third-party insurer would offer to
prosecute arbitral claims on behalf of consumers for a premium paid
prior to any actual privacy violations that affect the consumer. In the
event that the arbitral mechanism becomes available to plaintiffs who
were harmed by violations, the insurer would undertake a duty to
bring claims on behalf of insured consumers and to pay over to
consumers some or all of any amounts collected on behalf of the
consumer. Ex ante, consumers are much more likely to purchase such
insurance based on their valuation of privacy protections rather than
based on opportunity costs. Indeed, to the extent that opportunity
costs do influence the ex ante insurance decision, it will be in the
direction of having high-privacy-value, high-opportunity-cost
individuals be more inclined to pay the premium.
Claims insurers might also advocate for greater substantive
privacy protections on behalf of their customers. With strong
reputations as privacy advocates, the insurers can attract more highprivacy-value customers. Indeed, it is conceivable that some firms
wishing to signal that they respect consumer privacy might facilitate
the insurer’s services or even offer to pay the insurance premiums on
behalf of the customers. However, this type of signaling will require a
regulatory regime that preserves the firm’s growth and innovation
possibilities.
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If the third-party insurer files claims on behalf of all its
consumers, perhaps the insurer should be permitted to aggregate
these claims. With a sufficiently successful insurance option, the
aggregated claims could begin to resemble a class claim. Nevertheless,
the insurer’s aggregated or “class” claim would have the advantage of
including only high-privacy-value plaintiffs. As a result, the
difficulties posed in the class actions described above would not be
present.
If the insurer is permitted to aggregate its customers’ claims, then
arbitrators could perhaps charge claimants at least modest
administrative fees to help cover the costs of arbitration. These fees
could help to discourage low-privacy-value, low-opportunity-cost
plaintiffs from free-riding off the efforts of the privacy advocates after
an aggregate claim has been filed. At the same time, if the costs are
sufficiently modest, some high-privacy-value consumers who did not
purchase insurance on the front end could file claims once a
company’s privacy violation has become apparent. Under such a
scheme, it is at least theoretically possible that the high-privacy-value
consumers purchase insurance, leading to feasible claims prosecution,
or add their claims after the fact, and the low-privacy-value
consumers are effectively foreclosed from asserting claims.
Note that under a third-party insurance scheme, the insurance
effectively serves as the pricing mechanism, while the arbitration is
merely a consumer-friendly forum, which serves to substitute away
from the overdeterrence problems associated with the conjunction of
class actions and FTC enforcement orders. If the arbitration scheme
were available after an FTC investigation determined that the
company had committed a privacy violation, these are the very cases
where both FTC actions and class action claims are currently likely,
and this conjunction represents the greatest risk of overdeterrence.
The proposed arbitration mechanism corrects the overdeterrence
problem by eliminating the conjunction, effectively substituting
property-rule FTC enforcement for liability rules, and preventing
class awards from assuming that all customers place a high value on
privacy.
Even if the overdeterrence problem can be corrected, or at least
substantially ameliorated with the proposed arbitration, what about
the potential for underdeterrence? Under the current enforcement
regime, underdeterrence can result from a number of sources,
including inevitable budget constraints and other scarce resources for
the FTC. Currently, class actions are available to supplement FTC
enforcement efforts, thereby helping to ameliorate underdeterrence
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problems. To help ease the potential for underdeterrence, the prenegotiated arbitration scheme should replace consumer class actions
even in cases where the FTC has not filed a complaint against the
company. In short, insurers and harmed consumers should have
independent enforcement authority. If so, then the class arbitration
would serve to lessen both overdeterrence (by sorting claimants) and
underdeterrence (by providing investigation and enforcement
independent of the FTC).
The question remains whether there can be a market for thirdparty claims insurance. In order for such a market to exist, there must
be (1) an absence of legal barriers to the offering of such insurance
(fueling the supply side); (2) an absence of, or ability to eliminate the
risks of adverse selection and moral hazard;115 and (3) a sufficiently
large pool of high-privacy-value consumers who are willing to
purchase the insurance (fueling the demand side). Assuming no legal
barriers to the offering of claims insurance, 116 are there adverse
selection or moral hazard problems? Adverse selection problems117
do not really apply to consumers, who are not exhibiting risks
relevant to the insurance premium.118 Moral hazard problems119 could
arise under our proposed scheme if consumers who purchase claims
insurance are less likely to take measures to protect their own privacy
in situations where both firms and consumers should take care to
protect privacy. Presumably either the scope of the claims coverage or

115. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373–74 (2003).
116. In the United States, this is called a prepaid legal service plan. See generally John
R. Dunne, Prepaid Legal Services Have Arrived, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1975) (describing
the advent and development of prepaid legal services); Brian Heid & Eitan Misulovin, The
Group Legal Plan Revolution: Bright Horizon or Dark Future?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 335 (2000) (discussing the details and recent growth of prepaid group legal plans
which allow the spreading of legal services among many to make them more affordable).
117. Adverse selection refers to the “theoretical tendency for low risk individuals to
avoid or drop out of insurance pools.” Baker, supra note 115, at 373.
118. The result of adverse selection is that insurance pools, absent countervailing
efforts by administrators, tend to contain a disproportionate percentage of high-risk
individuals. Id. In the context of insurance claims, however, consumers presumably do not
possess asymmetric information about the risk that firms they deal with will violate
consumer privacy rights. As a result, all consumers theoretically share equally in the
information that firms may violate consumer privacy rights, thereby rending all consumers
“at-risk.”
119. Moral hazard refers to the “change in incentives that can result from insurance
protection.” Id. There tends to be an inversely proportional relationship between
protection and risk, whereby “[r]isks that pose a very high degree of moral hazard
typically are not insurable at all,” such as intentional harm. Id. at 374.
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the applicable rules applied to the privacy claim could take into
account the mutual care issue, where it is present.120
The most pressing potential impediment to the rise of a thirdparty insurance market is the possibility that too few consumers value
privacy highly enough to purchase such insurance. The greater the
number of consumers who are willing to purchase the insurance, the
cheaper the premium, given that aggregation of consumer claims in
arbitration should reduce the costs per consumer of prosecuting
future claims. Available empirical evidence indicates that although
consumers often express opinions that suggest they place a high value
on privacy, in practice consumers tend to be willing to pay relatively
little for privacy protections. 121 At the same time consumer
willingness to sign away privacy rights appears to be heavily
contingent on the framing of the issue. 122 Specifically, consumer
willingness to share data can turn on the playfulness of the website
design or the specific pieces of information over which consumers are
given control.123 One way that third-party insurers might be able to
induce consumers to purchase the insurance is to overcome consumer
ignorance of the risks they face by calling to mind specific risks to
consumers.124
Plaintiffs’ claims insurance does not seem to exist in the U.S.,
although that is likely due to the fact that contingency fees serve to
minimize risks for plaintiffs.125 In Germany, where contingency fees
are not permitted, plaintiff-side litigation insurance is common.126
120. See id. at 373–74 (explaining that insurers often require the consumers to
relinquish control, such as over the settlement and defense of claims, or retain
“coinsurance” to protect from moral hazard problems). It helps that the claims coverage
conceived here gives the insurer, rather than the consumer, control over the litigation
decision. See id.
121. Acquisti et al., supra note 54, at 41; Norberg et al., supra note 97, at 103, 118.
122. See Somini Sengupta, Letting Down Our Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at
BU1.
123. Id. (explaining, for example, the increased willingness to provide identifying
information such as date of birth on Facebook).
124. Cf. Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data:
Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015
/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust
[https://perma.cc/KLV7-HPLC]
(noting that consumers are typically ignorant of the specific types of data sharing and uses
to which they are subject).
125. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law . . . What Might Happen if Contingent
Legal Fees were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 330–35 (1998) (discussing the
relationship between contingent fees and plaintiffs’ litigation insurance).
126. Forty percent of West German households studied in 1979 had purchased
insurance covering at least some legal expenses. Erhard Blankenburg, Legal Insurance,
Litigant Decisions, and the Rising Caseload of Courts: A West German Study, 16 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 601, 605 (1981–82).
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Additionally, the costs to providing claims insurance would be smaller
where fee shifting is permitted, a common feature in private
arbitration 127 that could be incorporated into FTC-approved
arbitration mechanisms. In the end, the development, or not, of a
claims insurance market could itself provide useful empirical evidence
of the extent to which consumers actually value privacy protection.
D. Other Complications and Objections Considered
What are other potential objections to such an arbitration
scheme? Even if arbitration could work well in some circumstances,
are there circumstances where it should not be used? This Section
considers possible objections and complications and concludes that,
while some may limit the circumstances in which the proposed
scheme could be feasibly implemented, none provide compelling
arguments against experimentation.
1. Arbitration Schemes Risk Potential Underdeterrence
If too few consumer claims are filed in arbitration, privacy
violations would be underdeterred.128 This potential problem should
be treated within the arbitration scheme rather than rejecting
arbitration altogether. If significant numbers of consumers who claim
to place a high value on their privacy nevertheless fail to come
forward, the problem could result either from costs associated with
the arbitration or a failure to effectively inform consumers of their
right to redress. Arbitration costs can be addressed over time by
tailoring the cost structure of the arbitration. Information problems
can be addressed through joint efforts by the firm, the FTC, and
127. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 71, at 164–66 (evaluating an empirical
study of arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts and finding that many either
provided for or assumed the possibility of attorney fee-shifting).
128. For an example of this charge, see the CFPB’s recent report to Congress on the
use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial instruments. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) app. A, at 7 (2015)
(“[C]ritics argue that arbitration clauses . . . may undermine deterrence and leave
widespread wrongdoing against consumers unaddressed.”). The CFPB presents findings
indicating that litigation outcomes are more successful for consumers than are individual
arbitration outcomes. Id. § 1, at 11–15. The development of a claims insurance market
under the proposed scheme could produce better incentives because it would allow
aggregation, similar to class actions, without enabling plaintiffs’ attorneys to demand
damages for low-privacy-value plaintiffs. See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad,
Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of Social Media, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
341, 370 (2014) (“[P]redispute arbitration clauses . . . discourage filings—therefore
shielding [companies] from any accountability for breach of [terms of use], tort claims,
intellectual property rights, privacy violations, or other causes of action.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2018)

2018]

CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY & ARBITRATION

743

plaintiffs’ advocate/lawyers to disseminate information about firm
violations and the arbitration option. If, notwithstanding well-drafted
arbitration schemes and significant efforts to disseminate information,
many consumers fail to step forward to exercise their rights through
arbitration, through insurance schemes or otherwise, it may be
reasonable to conclude that the passive consumers do not, in fact,
value their privacy at sufficiently high values to register their
grievances and collect compensation. That revelation would not be
one of underdeterrence but rather of overprotection of privacy with
formal legal rules. If there are specific contexts where
underdeterrence seems particularly likely or costly, the FTC might
refuse to displace its regulatory authority or may refuse to permit the
use of the arbitral scheme.
2. Privacy Should Be Protected via Property Rules, Not Liability
Rules
Privacy advocates might object to the use of liability rather than
property rules to protect privacy on grounds that consumers who
value privacy at high levels will not be satisfied with ex post monetary
awards when that privacy is violated. After all, the creepiness or loss
of dignity associated with privacy violations may be incommensurable
with money. 129 Although this objection could limit the political
feasibility of this arbitration scheme, it should not displace
experimentation altogether. As some scholars have pointed out, one
difficulty with obtaining consumer consent for the use of data is that
consumers often do not know until after the fact whether they will
object to particular uses of their data simply because it is too hard to
imagine all possible data uses at the time that consent is obtained.130
In this world where consumers cannot forecast future privacy harms,
even high-value consumers might agree to liability rules, which can
judge corporate actions after the fact, when it is known how the
information was used, and by whom.

129. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1398 (2000); Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and
Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 453, 483 (2001).
130. See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited Consumer Privacy Protections
Against the Lawyers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 483,
496–97, 518–19 (2014) (“[C]onsenting [consumers seem] to be making a long-term
commitment to the control of their data by other parties for uses that are unimaginable at
the time of consent.”).
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3. Actual Fraud/Intentional Deceit Should Still Be Enjoined
The arbitration scheme works best in cases where it is important
to carefully calibrate firm incentives such as unintentional disclosure
of private consumer information. Instances in which overdeterrence is
less problematic, such as intentional wrongdoing, may be better
regulated by the current regulatory scheme. In cases alleging fraud or
intentional deception, however, the FTC or other enforcing plaintiff
should be required to show fraudulent intent on the part of the target
firm, and that intent must be present at the time that the firm issued
its disclosures, privacy policies, etc. These are standard elements of
common law fraud,131 so the limitation is in no way radical. But the
important point is that the FTC should not be able to claim
“deception” or “unfairness” without satisfying the elements of
common law fraud, in cases where the arbitration scheme is not
permitted.
4. Protection of Health Information Should Not Require Affirmative
Action by Patients
Consumer preferences may be significantly less heterogeneous
regarding the use and dissemination of at least some forms of health
information, and, on average, patients appear to highly value
protection of their health information. 132 Without heterogeneous
preferences, the problems associated with consumer valuation are
somewhat mitigated, and with high valuations, the potential
overdeterrence problem is also mitigated. Under these circumstances
the case against the current regime of FTC enforcement orders and
class actions fades.
Yet, perhaps arbitration mechanisms should at least be
considered as an option for those health privacy violations that trigger
very different responses across patient populations. For example,
while a healthy majority of patients might be uncomfortable sharing
their mental health histories and problems, patients might face
heterogeneous preferences about the disclosure of other conditions

131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
132. Joy L. Pritts, The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health
Information: The Roles of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common Rule in Health
Research, DIVISION OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENGINEERING, & MED. 1,
5–8 (2008) http://iom.nationalacademics.org/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Research
/HIPAAandResearch/PrittsPrivacyFinalDraftwed.ashx [https://perma.cc/BAC6-5J2B]
(discussing the importance of protecting the privacy of health information by reviewing
public attitudes toward the privacy of health information and discusses the value that
privacy serves in the health case context).
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like ear infections or headaches. In these circumstances,
heterogeneous preferences and the possibility of overdeterrence for
some health data uses are present, indicating that the arbitration
mechanism could improve matters.
Moreover, many of the security breach issues for medicine are
similar to those found in the general commercial context. Medical
records routinely contain Social Security numbers, addresses, and
next of kin, and access to insurance information facilitates the filing of
fraudulent claims, making medical data every bit as valuable to
hackers as commercial data. 133 In fact, healthcare organizations
accounted for nearly half of all major data breaches in 2014,134 which
suggests that differential treatment across the board may not be
warranted.
5. Security Beaches Cause Externalities by Encouraging Hacking of
All Firms, and Arbitration is Unlikely to Capture that Cost
Incentives to hack may be present regardless of the incidence of
actual breaches. That said, firms with more highly-valued information
should make more efforts to protect consumer data from potential
hackers. A well-constructed arbitration scheme should be able to sort
these firms from those with low-value information. Moreover, a wellconstructed arbitration scheme should be better able to value
consumer privacy, especially in the face of heterogeneous consumer
privacy values. Security breaches capture a lot of press attention, and
they cause widespread concern among consumers, at least in the short
term.135 For these reasons it may not be politically feasible to relegate
133. Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers
than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2014/09/24/us-cybersecurity-hospitals-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924
[https://perma.cc/D8D73UM9].
134. Greg Slabodkin, 2014 Was Landmark Year for Health Data Breaches, HEALTH
DATA MGMT. (Dec. 26, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news
/2014-Landmark-Year-for-Health-Data-Breaches-49505-1.html [https://perma.cc/CAQ94FXB].
135. See, e.g., Melanie Eversley & Kim Hjelmgaard, Target Confirms Massive CreditCard Data Breach, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2013/12/18/secret-service-target-data-breach/4119337/
[https://perma.cc/SU3P9WP9]; Greg Farrell & Patricia Hurtado, JP Morgan’s 2014 Hack Ties to Largest Cyber
Breach Ever, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2015-11-10/hackers-accused-by-u-s-of-targeting-top-banks-mutual-funds
[https://perma.cc/PW7Y-DHUV (staff uploaded archive)]; Gordon Kelly, eBay Suffers
Massive Security Breach, All Users Must Change Their Passwords, FORBES (May 21,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonkelly/2014/05/21/ebay-suffers-massive-securitybreach-all-users-must-their-change-passwords/ [https://perma.cc/92C9-UGGN]; Jeff John
Roberts, Home Depot to Pay Banks $25 Million in Data Breach Settlement, FORTUNE
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claims involving data security breaches to the more private forum of
arbitration. On the other hand, public attention to company behaviors
can be achieved through other mechanisms. For example, perhaps
political issues can be handled by calling firm leaders to explain
themselves to Congressional committees, with testimony aired by CSPAN and other news channels. If so, public shaming can provide
additional incentives for companies to take care, suggesting that
arbitration could potentially work here too.
6. The Arbitration Scheme Would Require Congressional Action
and Therefore Could Flounder Politically
The proposed arbitration might well require congressional
action. Current FTC authority does not extend to the imposition of
monetary liability, and although the FTC presumably could promise
to refrain from section 5 enforcement actions in return for any
number of firm promises, its oversight role in the arbitration scheme
likely would require congressional action. Current and past
arbitration schemes monitored by the FTC were affirmatively
authorized and directed by Congress in the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act,136 so they do not provide precedent for FTC authority
to institute or manage the arbitration of privacy claims. Moreover, if
the arbitration scheme works to displace class actions, congressional
authorization could similarly be required. Currently, individual
arbitration can replace class actions under the FAA, but that statute’s
operation requires an agreement to arbitrate between the parties,137
whereas the proposed arbitration scheme would operate even in the
absence of consumer agreement. As a consequence, separate
statutory authorization would be required.
Several consumer privacy statutes have, of late, been thwarted in
Congress, and this one could also flounder. Industry advocates have
killed recently proposed statutes that stalled in congressional

(Mar.
9,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/home-depot-data-breach-banks/
[https://perma.cc/Z5PV-PQFF (staff-uploaded archive)]; Jonathan Stempel & Jim Finkle,
Yahoo Says All Three Billion Accounts Hacked in 2013 Data Theft, REUTERS (Oct. 3,
2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-all-three-billion-accountshacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1 [https://perma.cc/KB5U-LTAT]; Gillian B.
White, A Cybersecurity Breach at Equifax Left Pretty Much Everyone’s Financial Data
Vulnerable, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/achrive
/2017/09/Equifax-cybersecurity-breach/539178/ [https://perma.cc/KR4U-AAT4].
136. Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637 § 110(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2189–90 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a) (2012)).
137. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2012).
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committee.138 Unlike other bills, however, this proposal circumvents
the status quo only if companies agree to arbitration. Because this
scheme costs firms nothing unless they affirmatively choose to
participate, proposed legislation should experience less industry
resistance. To the extent this proposal threatens to replace the current
tools for privacy advocates, however, it could fail to garner the
requisite support for passage. On the other hand, with the promise of
FTC oversight and the prospect of greater protection for highprivacy-value consumers, a carefully formulated proposed scheme
could become a grand bargain between industry and privacy
advocates.
7. Arbitration Might Be a Poor Forum for Law Creation
Arbitration is not generally viewed to be a superior forum for the
development of law because it is typically closed to the public and an
arbitrator’s decision generally does not create precedent.139 Privacy
law is underdeveloped and must pay very careful attention to
technological advances, so one might conclude that privacy law needs
to advance considerably before an arbitration option could perform
well.140 This critique suggests, at a minimum, that privacy arbitrations
should be open to the public and arbitrators should be required to
follow FTC statements about sound privacy policy. Public
participation and FTC evaluation of the legal principles developed in
arbitration can both help to steer legal development in healthy,
carefully-deliberated directions. Because the arbitrators can develop
an expertise in the area of privacy, their decisions might well prove
superior to those of generalist judges. And if the firms want
assurances of predictable legal rules, the arbitrators could adopt a
system of precedent. The inability of firms to appeal the arbitrator’s
decision might cause the firms to be wary of agreeing to the
arbitration scheme, so perhaps an option to appeal to the FTC

138. See, e.g., John Brodkin, For Sale: Your Private Browsing History, ARS TECHNICA
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/for-sale-your-private-browsing
-history/ [https://perma.cc/DZA8-6J5H] (quoting U.S. Representative Mike Doyle as
stating that many companies rely on lobbying efforts to defeat privacy bills); Kate
Tummarello, ‘Big Data’ Lobbyist: Congress Doesn’t Want Online Privacy Law, THE HILL
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/215457-big-data-lobbyist-congressdoesnt-want-online-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/XS8D-A6BZ] (“A lobbyist for one of
the top companies that trades in consumer data is confident that Congress won’t set rules
for how online marketers use information about consumers.”); see also supra note 3.
139. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 207–14
(2006).
140. Special thanks to Robert Jackson for identifying this critique.

96 N.C. L. REV. 711 (2018)

748

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

Commissioners could be incorporated.141 In any event, more careful
thought on this front is highly advisable.
CONCLUSION
A critical missing component of the regulation of consumer data
use is a pricing mechanism. The FTC, consumer advocates, and
plaintiffs’ attorneys all correctly assert that privacy protection is an
important goal of sound government policies, but translating that
norm into the realm of consumer data use is difficult. Privacy harms
are subjective, and consumers seem to vary significantly in their
attitudes toward many uses of consumer data. The subjective nature
of privacy harms can lead the FTC and the courts to not impose
damages or restrictions on firm behavior, even when that the firm’s
actions cause harm. When the government does regulate consumer
data use out of a commitment to privacy, it likely ends up
overregulating firm behavior, given that consumer harm is
heterogeneous. Without an effective pricing mechanism, the risk of
any one government actor’s decision causing overdeterrence or
underdeterrence remains significant. Given that multiple government
actors can effectively regulate firm behavior, the overdeterrence risk
seems more likely.
This Article offers a separate regulatory possibility that could
incorporate a pricing/sorting mechanism into consumer redress for
privacy harms: FTC-approved mandatory arbitration of consumer
claims that would replace both FTC enforcement orders and class
action litigation. In particular, the arbitration mechanism proposed
here would seek to set an effective “price” for redress, in terms of
both opportunity costs and out-of-pocket expenses, that would enable
high-privacy-value consumers to bring claims while foreclosing those
by low-privacy-value consumers. The sorting mechanism here is
imperfect, however, because it would have a tendency to also sort
claimants according to the opportunity costs of their time rather than
solely according to their preferences regarding privacy. A third-party
consumer claims insurance mechanism, under which the third party
obtains an ex ante premium from the consumer and, in return, agrees
to prosecute claims on behalf of the consumer in the event of a firm
privacy violation, could work to more effectively sort the high- and
low-privacy-value consumers. A question remains whether such a

141. Of course, this option might add to the FTC’s administrative burden, but
arbitration fees paid by the companies could enable the hiring of support personnel to
assist.
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complicated mechanism is viable. Experimentation with the FTCapproved arbitration should nevertheless proceed to make room for
the possibility of a regulatory regime that, at least in some quarters,
might substantially improve the pricing of privacy.
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